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Speech
The Constitution, the Presidency, and
the Rule of Law*
By L. PETER SCIIULTZ**
My topic of discussion is the presidency within the Constitution and how this office affects, or should affect, our understanding of the "rule of law." At the very beginning, let me state my
argument as follows. It is, to my mind, a mistake to try to
understand the Constitution in light of the traditional concept of
the "rule of law." Indeed, interpreting the Constitution in light
of the "rule of law" puts the cart before the horse, so to speak.
The task is to understand the "rule of law" in light of the
Constitution because, if I am correct, the wisdom of the Constitution is that it is a law that knows the limits of law and,
therewith, qualifies the "rule of law." I focus my remarks on the
presidency because it is in article II that the Constitution's qualification of the "rule of law" is most visible. To illustrate my
argument in a preliminary way, I would say that it is altogether
fitting that a distinct minority of our presidents have been lawyers.
This is fitting because, ultimately, the powers and responsibilities
of the presidency are as often political as they are legal. But I
am getting ahead of myself, so let me retreat and speak first
about the Constitution, then about the presidency, and finally
about the rule of law.
First, the Constitution. It is customary in our attempt to
interpret the Constitution, to say what that law means, that we
look for signposts to guide us on our way. Some have looked to
"the higher law background of the Constitution"; some have
* Student Bar Association Bicentennial of the Constitution Lecture, University of
Kentucky College of Law, March 12, 1987.
** Associate Professor of Politics, Radford University; B.A., Wake Forest University, 1968; M.A., University of Chicago, 1973; Ph.D., Northern Illinois University, 1979.
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looked to the Enlightenment and its philosophers such as Hobbes,
Locke, and Montesquieu; some have looked to the English legal
tradition, to Blackstone, to Lord Coke, and to others; some have
looked to Scotland and those known as the "communitarians";
and some have even looked further back to the very origins of
political science in the works of Aristotle and, for some, Machiavelli.
Often, other signposts are used. More particularly, long-standing ideas, ideas with a pedigree, so to speak, are used as aids in
interpreting the Constitution. We can call these ideas "big ideas,"
or if you wish to sound more sophisticated, "concepts." Whatever
you might call these ideas, let me illustrate how useful they are
in interpreting the Constitution, using for purposes of illustration
that "big idea," "the rule of law."
Apparently, the rule of law is not a bad place to begin in
interpreting the Constitution. It has a long history and an honorable pedigree, being traceable at least as far back as Aristotle
and his Politics, where it is argued that the rule of law is the best
practicable form of government. Moreover, besides this honorable
pedigree, the rule of law sounds acceptable, even praiseworthy.
Although some ambiguity exists as to its meaning, it is generally
taken to be a substitute for the rule of men (or persons), a rule
which replaces discretion and arbitrariness with rules and certainty
and maybe even fairness. This seems good.
Once we undertake to use the rule of law as the polestar of
our constitutional jurisprudence, much more follows quite logically from this. If the rule of law is the guiding principle of the
Constitution, then the legislature should be supreme, or at least
predominant, since it is the legislature that makes the laws. And
if the legislature is supreme or predominant, then it should be the
policy-maker and its policy, having the form of law, should be
superior to other forms of policy-e.g., that concocted in the
bowels of the White House. Finally, if the legislature is supreme,
then we should understand the separation of powers as a way of
checking government to render it "safe," while not undermining
the principle of legislative supremacy.
Beginning then with the apparently uncontroversial concept
of the rule of law, we have gone a long way toward rendering
the Constitution intelligible. We know now, for example, that the
separation of powers is a way of rendering government safe,
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although inefficient. As Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissenting
opinion in Myers v. United StatesI in a statement that is probably
familiar to all:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by
the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to
avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident
to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy. 2
Again, beginning with the rule of law, we can read "legislative
supremacy" into the Constitution, much as Justice Holmes did
in his dissenting opinion in Myers. As Holmes argued there:
We have to deal with an office that owes its existence to
Congress and that Congress may abolish tomorrow. Its duration
and the pay attached to it while it lasts depend on Congress
alone. Congress alone confers on the President the power to
appoint to it and at any time may transfer the power to other
hands. With such power over its own creation, I have no more
trouble in believing that Congress has power to prescribe a term
of life for it free from any interference than I have in accepting
the undoubted power of Congress to decree its end.3
Finally, beginning with the rule of law, we can then subordinate the president to the law, making him an enforcer of the
law, as much bound by those laws as a policeman is when on his
"beat." As Justice McReynolds argued in his dissenting opinion
in the Myers case:
A certain repugnance must attend the suggestion that the
President may ignore any provision of an Act of Congress under
which he has proceeded....
Congress, by clear language, is empowered to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution powers vested
in [the President]. Here he was authorized only to appoint an
officer of a certain kind, for a certain period, removable only
in a certain way. He undertook to proceed under the law so far

2

272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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as agreeable, but repudiated the remainder.
I submit that no
4
warrant can be found for such conduct.
I have relied on these dissenting opinions in the Myers case
because, first, they are used often as statements that capture the
essence of the American constitutional order. Second, I use them
because they are dissents, indicating that there is another view of
the Constitution. In fact, I think that this alternative view, presented in Myers by Chief Justice Taft, is more consistent with the
Constitution. This suggests that it is a mistake to interpret the
Constitution so as to square it with tradition or convention. The
Constitution was conceived, I think, as a significant break with
the past and, therefore, needs to be understood on its own terms
and not in terms of "tradition" as in the phrase "the British
tradition" and perhaps not even as in the phrase "the JudeoChristian tradition." To be sure, the Constitution does have roots
in a particular historical situation. But in reading and interpreting
the Constitution, we should leave behind such baggage as "tradition," and take that document as we find it, unenhanced or
unencumbered by external trappings. Only when we have done
this can we say what the separation of powers means in the
Constitution; can we say whether legislative supremacy has a place
in the political order created by the Constitution; and can we say
what the rule of law means under the Constitution. In sum, we
should interpret the "rule of law" in light of the Constitution; we
should not interpret the Constitution in light of the "rule of law."
Before turning to article II and the presidency, let me offer
one example or illustration of my argument that the Constitution
constitutes a significant break with tradition. Consider the qualifications for office under the Constitution. It is fair to say that
these qualifications are limited, even sparse. There are no property
qualifications under the Constitution, a fact too often overlooked
when we assess the democratic credentials of that document. Alsoand again this is all too often overlooked by the document's
critics-there is no sexual qualification-or disqualification-for
holding office. When it comes to holding office, the Constitution
only knows "citizens." It knows neither male nor female, neither
rich nor poor. And perhaps most interesting of all-and certainly
overlooked today-the Constitution contains no religious qualifiI Id. at

179, 231-32 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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cation for holding office. In fact, in article VI the Constitution
says that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." 5
This want of a religious test for holding office did not go
unnoticed by the Anti-Federalists, those who opposed the ratification of the Constitution. They thought this a grievous oversight,
one which would make it possible for atheists and, even worse,
for papists to hold the office under the Constitution. This may
seem humorous today, but from the point of view of tradition,
the Anti-Federalists' concerns are sensible. Can it be thought that
a person's religion-or whether a person has a religion-is unimportant in determining whether that person is qualified to hold
office? Certainly, whatever we might think today, religion was
deemed to be very important in 1787. Even Thomas Jefferson
was prepared to exclude the testimony of atheists from the courts
because their oaths were unsupportable by faith.
From the traditional point of view, the one espoused by the
Anti-Federalists, the person makes the office and, therefore, one
should be very careful in determining who may hold what office.
The Constitution is not careful, however, and this is because it
breaks with tradition, stands it on its head, so to speak, by
assuming that the office will make the person. Hence, the Constitution does not rely on religion, wealth, or sex as qualifications
for office. It does not need them. The offices created and arranged by the Constitution allow us to choose our representatives
from the great mass of the people who inhabit the American
republic, whether those chosen are trained in the law, in the
military, in the business world, in a seminary, or even by Zen
Buddhists in the art of motorcycle maintenance, to say nothing
of even more exotic teachings.
A reminder of what has been said so far. I have been arguing
that the Constitution is a most untraditional document and, therefore, that it is best to leave aside traditional concepts when
interpreting that document, One such concept is the rule of law
and, like other traditional concepts, this one does more to obscure
than to illuminate the Constitution, an argument that I will now
attempt to defend. For this purpose, I will focus my attention on
article II of the Constitution.
' U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl,3.
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Article II is a most interesting part of the Constitution, especially when read with this question in mind: What legal limits
exist on presidential power or on the president himself? This
question is relevant especially if you understand the Constitution
as taking its bearings from the rule of law. But if you read article
II with that question in mind, you will find it difficult to identify
any such limits.
Consider, by way of example, the president's tenure of office.
In one way, this term is limited by the Constitution to four years.
Every four years the president must face an election. But in
another way, the president's tenure is unlimited by law because,
under the original, unamended Constitution, the president could
succeed himself indefinitely. In other words, there are no legal
limits on the president's tenure of office. (In fact, there are no
legal limits on the tenure of any office established by the Constitution.)
It is useful to allow this constitutional fact its fullest impact.
What determines the number of years a president may serve is
not the Constitution, is not the supreme law of the land. The
supreme law leaves open the question of the length of the president's tenure; it leaves this question unsettled, much as it leaves
open the qualifications of the heads of departments and of the
justices of the Supreme Court, even while entrusting the selection
of both to the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Putting this differently, the length of any particular president's
tenure-under the original Constitution-was not a question decided by the law. It was a question to be decided politically.
Thus, it is not unfair to ask those who advocate the view that
the Constitution embraces the concept of the rule of law to explain
why this rather important issue is to be settled politically and not
legally.
Let me explain more fully where I am going, in case it remains
unclear. When one reads article II of the Constitution, the legal
limits on the executive power are very difficult to identify and to
establish. So far, I have used the president's tenure as my example. I did so because this is a particularly important issue and
because it illustrates as well as anything that the limits on presidential power are more political than legal. And this is, of course,
the core of my argument herein: The Constitution does not establish a limited executive in a traditional or legal sense. Rather,
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the limits on executive power are political. In terms of the rule
of law, we may say that the Constitution recognizes a realm of
activity that is beyond the reach of law, a realm of activity in
which law or even legal standards are insufficient.
For a recent manifestation of this argument, I invite you to
read Nixon v. Fitzgerald6 in which the Supreme Court decided
that the president is, under the Constitution, absolutely immune
from civil suits. As Justice Powel argues there for the Court,
this decision does not put the president beyond all limits; he is
still subject to both constitutional and political restraints.
A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the
Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct on the
part of the Chief Executive. There remains the constitutional
remedy of impeachment. In addition, there are formal and
informal checks on Presidential action ....

The President is

subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vigilant oversight
by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of
office.... Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a

desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an
element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional
7
concern for his historical stature.
In sum, Justice Powell is suggesting, first, that the executive
power, in significant respects, is beyond the reach of the law. As
Powell says in his opinion: "The President occupies a unique
position in the constitutional scheme." 8 Unique because among
his duties are the conduct of foreign affairs, which is "a realm
in which ... '[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the
relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret'. . . ."9 Unique also because his duties include "management
of the Executive Branch-a task for which 'imperative reasons
requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the
most important of his subordinates in their most important duties.' ,"0
457 U.S. 731 (1982).
Id. at 757.
Id. at 749.
'Id. at 750 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
10 Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 134 (1926)).
6
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Secondly, however, Powell emphasizes that legal checks are
not the only variety of restraint our Constitution relies on. Indeed,
with regard to the presidency, in which "there exists the greatest
public interest in providing .

.

. 'the maximum ability to deal

fearlessly and impartially with' the duties of [that] office,"' 1
reliance on legal constraints is misplaced. Here we rely on extralegal constraints, what may be called political constraints. And
here we see most clearly the limits of the rule of law as established-or as modified-by the Constitution.
The legal limits on the executive power are hard to find. To
be sure, the president, in order to appoint to office or to make
a treaty, needs the consent of the Senate. And with regard to
treaties, he must have an extraordinary majority of the Senate
for a treaty to have the force of law. But these checks on
presidential power are not legal in character and were not intended
to be used in a legal manner. Vested as they are in only one
house of a bicameral legislature, it is clear that, whatever oversight
these checks allow the Senate, they are not legal in character.
When performing its duties with regard to appointments and
treaties, the Senate is not performing a legislative function and,
like the president in other matters, cannot be bound by the law.
When acting in these capacities, the Senate exercises a political
discretion-and more often than not defers to the president's
political judgment even in matters as important as the appointment of a new chief justice of the United States. And contrary
to the argument that the Senate has not lived up to constitutional
expectations and has not held its own in what is perceived to be
a continuing struggle for power with the president, one can argue
that the Senate has behaved in accordance with the expectations
of the Constitution. For under the Constitution, appointments
and treaties are entrusted to the president's discretion, to which
the Senate most often defers.
But surely someone might object to this argument by pointing
to section 4 of article II, which says that "It]he President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,2
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'
" Id. at 752 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) (emphasis
added)).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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Does this section not indicate, my imaginary adversary might ask,
that in the final analysis the checks on presidential power are
indeed more legal than political? When the president oversteps
the bounds of his constitutional office, he is subject to removal
from office by means of this impeachment process.
At first reading, one well could conclude that the impeachment process does confirm the view that there are-or were in
the minds of the Constitution's framers-distinct legal limits to
the executive power, legal limits enforced by the legislature. While
the president operates within these limits as policed by the legislature, he is free to do as he thinks best. But once he transgresses
these limits, he is subject to being removed from office after
impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate. Indeed,
that one reasonably can interpret the impeachment process in this
way is confirmed by the fact that during the constitutional convention Gouverneur Morris so interpreted it-and opposed it until
his understanding of the process was changed and he was convinced that such a process would not subordinate the president
to Congress. Originally, Morris opposed impeichment because he
feared that it would so subordinate the executive, that it would
allow Congress to control the executive and to deprive it of what
Morris deemed its necessary and proper independence. As Morris
said:
The Executive is also impeachable. This is a dangerous part of
the plan. It will hold him in such dependence that he will be
no check on the legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the
people and of the public interest. He will be a tool of a faction,
of some leading demagogue in the Legislature. 3
Morris was persuaded to support this provision and the idea
of impeachment when he was persuaded that it would serve as a
"NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men,' 1 4 to
use Hamilton's language from the Federalist.Morris came to see
that such a proceeding was necessary because of the scope of the
president's responsibilities and in order to punish those guilty of
offenses that "are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety
o 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 53 (1966).
'4 Tim FEDERALIST No. 65, at 397 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis
in original).
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be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries
' 15
done immediately to the society itself.'
By this view, the impeachment process is more political than
legal. The use of this process as conceived by the framers would
"agitate the passions of the whole community, and... divide it
' 6
into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused.'
In fact, Publius argued that this process is always in danger of
becoming merely partisan, exciting "all [the] animosities, partialities, influence, and interest' '1 7 of pre-existing factions, even to
the point that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt.' ' 8 Impeachment and trial of a president for
high crimes and high misdemeanors is more a political than a
legal affair; it is a process reserved for what may be called
"political crimes" rather than for ordinary or statutory crimes.
Impeachment and trial are the ultimate checks on a presidentand as such they reveal the political character of that powerful
office.
There are other parts of article II that could be used to
support the argument that the presidency essentially is not subjected to legal limits by the Constitution. For example, one could
refer to the first sentence of article II, which says that "[tihe
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America."' 19 This language should be contrasted with the language of the first sentence of article I, which says that "[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States .... ,,20 Article II then vests all the executive
power in the president, not merely those executive powers enumerated in article II. For one example of such a power being vested
without being enumerated in article II, one need only look as far
as the first Congress which concluded that the removal power
was vested in the president alone by virtue of the Constitution
and, therefore, beyond the reach of the law or the legislature.

11Id. at

396 (emphasis in original).

1 Id.

Id.
Id. at 397.
,9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Id. at art. I, § 1.
17
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Again, the president is the commander-in-chief of the nation's
armed forces and, as Justice Jackson reminds us in Korematsu v.
United States,21 "[n]o court can require such a commander ...
to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and
exacting. Perhaps he should be." 22 Thus, one of the most deeplyrooted legal standards, reasonableness, is inadequate for assessing
how well the president performs his role as commander-in-chief.
In this role, the president is beyond the reach of the courts and
even of the law. To ask the commander-in-chief to act only in a
legal manner or in accord with legal norms would be to impose
an inappropriate and potentially dangerous standard on the president, and one not required by the Constitution.
Also, I have not mentioned the president's pardoning power,
which Hamilton denominates "prerogative" in the Federalist. Of
course, this power puts the president above the law since it allows
him to suspend the laws in order to meet those "critical moments"
when "[t]he loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be
fatal," and which, "if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never
be possible afterwards to recall." 23 Again, it seems clear that the
Constitution entrusts responsibilities to the president that are more
than legal and that should not, therefore, be constrained by the
law.
Indeed, even the president's responsibility to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed . . ."24 is affected by the political
character of the office. As early as Marbury v. Madison,25 the
Supreme Court drew a distinction between "executive" and "ministerial" duties, with the former being entrusted to the discretion
of the president and only the latter being enforceable in a court
of law. In the performance of his executive duties, the president
is free to use his discretion, and he is not bound by the will of
the legislature nor is he bound by the rule of the courts.
But where does this leave us? Obviously, since it was my
intention to do so, I have undermined the centrality of "the rule
of law" for understanding the Constitution. Insofar as I have

21 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
I2
FEDERALIST No. 74 supra note 14, at 449.
24U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

2THE
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fulfilled my intention, we are likely to feel less secure, less certain;
we may even feel like we are afloat on an unchartered sea and
subject to the absolute discretion of the person whom we have
chosen captain.
In response to this, my first inclination is to say: Congratulations, for you are experiencing the feeling that affected many
of the Anti-Federalists when the Constitution was proposed for
ratification. Again and again, the Anti-Federalists criticized the
ambiguity of the Constitution, its failure to establish clear and
constitutional limits on the tenure of office, its failure to delineate
clearly the powers of the president, and its failure to establish
firm limits on the scope of the judicial power. They. sensed, I
think, that the Constitution was in fact breaking with the past,
with tradition, and that in large part this break modified the "rule
of law."
Ultimately, there may be no better response to the AntiFederalists than to say: "So be it-and choose your captain
wisely." But there is more, and there is even some ground for
solace in our search for constitutional government. The president
is checked not merely by politics but also by the Constitution. As
William Howard Taft wrote in his book, Our Chief Magistrate
and His Powers:26 "The Constitution does give the President wide
discretion and great power, and it ought to do so. It calls from
him activity and energy to see that within his proper sphere he
does what his great responsibilities and opportunities require." 27
For Taft, among all our presidents the preeminent constitutionalist, the president does possess great power and wide discretion. But neither this power nor this discretion is unlimited. For
Taft, there is a distinct presidential sphere of activity and, although it is difficult to find legal limits to presidential power, one
can define and limit that power by thinking in terms of presidential responsibility.
What is the president responsible for under the Constitution?
Preeminently for preserving the peace. As Taft argued:
The President is made Commander-in-Chief of the army
and the navy... evidently for the purpose of enabling him to

TAFT, OUR CMEF MAGISTRATE AND HIs PowERs (1916).
Id. at 140-41.

2W.
"
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defend the country against invasion, to suppress insurrection
and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
In
other words, he is to maintain the peace of the United States.2

Or as Hamilton wrote under the pseudonym "Pacificus" in his
debate with Madison over Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality" "In this distribution of authority, the wisdom of our
Constitution is manifested. It is the province and duty of the
executive [power] to preserve to the nation the blessings of peace.
The Legislature alone can interrupt them by placing the nation in
a state of war." 29
By this view, the president is responsible for preserving to this
nation-not to the world-the blessings of peace. His responsibility is not making the world safe for democracy, to mention
one alternative understanding of presidential responsibility He
may have to defend this nation and its citizens-and he may act
unilaterally and secretly should he determine such action is necessary-but he may not wage war on his own authority, even if
it is "a war to end all wars." Or to use two illustrations that
come to mind, he may act unilaterally to get Soviet missiles out
of Cuba, but he may not wage war unilaterally in distant places
for extended periods of time against ambiguous threats to the
national security
Although I would not grant it readily, eventually I would
grant that the solace we find in the Taft-Hamilton understanding
of presidential power is not great enough. As Taft quite candidly
admitted, the presidency is the seat of greatness in our constitutional order. He sensed that this greatness is not best measured
in legal terms or in terms of the president's capacity to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
9)30 This is, as Taft
argued, an important executive responsibility; ultimately, it is not
at the heart of the president's constitutional responsibilities. At
the heart of those responsibilities are what Chief Justice John
Marshall called "executive" or political duties: the responsibility
of assessing and, if necessary, repairing the State of the umon;
Id. at 128-29 (emphasis in the original).
29 4

THE WoRxs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 443 (H. Lodge ed. 1904).

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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the responsibility for proposing and helping Congress formulate
comprehensive political reforms such as the Square Deal, the New
Deal, the New Frontier, the Great Society, or the New Federalism;
and finally, the responsibility of defending this nation and ensuring that its security goes uncompromised-including the responsibility, again, of advancing bold new initiatives, even controversial
initiatives, that in the president's judgment will enhance our security.
It was because Taft sensed the character of the presidential
office that he admired his predecessor so greatly. But it just might
be that this admiration points to the ultimate shortcoming of
Taft's understanding of presidential power. For our political history illustrates-or so it could be argued-that preserving the
peace and security of this nation is neither a sufficient guide for
our foreign policy nor a sufficient measure of our worth as a
nation. A "fortress America," one turned inward and away from
the world, may indeed be secure, but it might well be a security
that lacks nobility. Taft's admiration of Roosevelt reflects the
appeal of the noble, of the great-souled man. As we have learned
from Aristotle, it is by the dimensions of a person's-and a
nation's-soul that one measures human and political greatness.
With this thought we have, I think, reached the limits of constitutional government and we are beginning to sail seas charted
only rarely, and only some time ago. The solace we seek still
escapes us, even given what Hamilton rightly calls "the wisdom
of our Constitution." This is not intended to belittle that wisdom
but merely to indicate that it may require supplementation at
sources not taught in any law school and, perhaps, not teachable
at all.

